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Abstract:  The model of China’s development has attracted worldwide and indeed China 
has undergone great transformation in the reform era.  This article evaluates China’s 
model of development especially the main defining component, i.e., China’s model of 
governance.  It suggests that China’s model of development is marked by an imbalance 
between fast opening of the economy and the society and sluggish opening of the 
political system.  The Chinese society has become much more open, reflected in the 
Chinese growing awareness of their legal rights.  The Chinese economy has become 
highly internationalized and open.  But much of Chinese politics is closed.  China’s 
governance, a major component of China’s model of development, can be regarded as 
pro-growth authoritarianism.  The Chinese state is effective in opening up the economy, 
promoting reform, and generating economic growth.  Nevertheless, the Chinese state 
offers weak protection of people’s rights and ineffectual mitigation of social grievances.  
These imbalances help produce social protests.  A viable solution requires faster opening 
of the political process and greater respects for interests of the society and its members. 
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Introduction: Uneven Opening of the Society, Economy, and Politics in China 
 
In the reform era China has undergone tremendous transformation and opening.  The 
glowing success of the Beijing Olympic Games, including the mega media show of the 
opening ceremony, the smooth completion of the games, and fantastic sports ventures, 
allows China to showcase its economic success.   
Nevertheless, the transformation in China has been uneven across spheres.  China’s 
society has also been opened up significantly.  The Chinese are no longer ignorant about 
the outside world.  They are attentive to the popular culture, especially movies, TV 
programs, music, entertainment, dresses, and life style of the West.  More importantly, the 
Chinese have become accustomed to individual initiatives, such as economic 
entrepreneurship and volunteering for the Olympic Games.  Importantly, they are aware 
of their legal rights and keen to defend them.  This marks a sharp departure from their 
docile or passive submission to the state in the pre-reform period.  In the economic realm, 
China’s opening has been most impressive.  After three decades of reform China has been 
transformed from one of the most isolated economies in the world into one of the most 
open in the developing world.   
However, in the political realm, despite overhaul of the governmental structure, 
agencies, and work style, the state has not been changed dramatically.  The Chinese 
Communist Party still dominates politics, and the policy making process remains largely 
inaccessible to the public.  As a result, the state and officials often ignore people’s rights, 
legitimate interests, due process and relevant laws.  Therefore, ironically, in the recent 
two decades frequent collective protests have gone hand in hand with high economic 
growth.
1
   
The purpose of this article is to analyze the features and limits of the mode of 
development, especially the model of governance in China.  China’s model of 
development is marked by uneven economic-social and political opening of China.  
China’s model of governance can be characterized by pro-growth authoritarianism.  I 
suggest that the Chinese model of governance is characterized by a gap between fast 
economic and social opening and slow political opening.  As far as governance is 
concerned, the Chinese state is indeed very effective in opening up and modernizing the 
economy.  However, it is very ineffective when it comes to protecting and respecting 
citizens’ legitimate social and economic rights, controlling rampant corruption, and 
enforcing the rule of law.  As Gilley put dramatically, “China’s performance in rights and 
freedom (author’s note: predominantly political freedom) is much worse than most 
developing countries, excepting those where political disorder cancels out any formal 
freedoms”. 2    High growth is thus not necessarily followed by a decrease in social 
protests.  On the contrary, flagrant violation of citizens’ rights in official aggressive 
pursuit of high growth results in public outrages and protests.   
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This article will first discuss the opening of the society in China.  It will then 
examine the rapid opening of the Chinese economy and the positive aspects of 
governance in China.  This is followed by a discussion of slow political opening and the 
severe limits of governance in China, as well as of the consequences of uneven opening, 
i.e., frequent protests in the wake of high economic growth and in China.  The article 
concludes by summing up the findings of the article and emphasizing the need for greater 
political opening in China. 
 
Social Opening and Rights Consciousness 
 
In the reform era the former and onerous restrictions on the society have been lifted or 
eroded.  People are freer to migrate across counties and provinces and even outside China; 
they no longer need state’s approval in finding a job and getting married; they are free to 
engage and even indulge in a variety of entertainment and hobbies and choose their 
favorite fashions. 
Associated with economic opening is social opening.  In the 1980s the state 
dismantled collective farming and reformed state-owned enterprises.  As a result, 
collectivism declined.  Individual economic initiatives are promoted and rewarded, 
reflected in the state’s encouragement of private enterprises and rise of private 
entrepreneurs which were prohibited during late Mao’s era.  The Chinese are more 
interested in personal and family material well-being than they did in Mao’s era.    
The Chinese become more conscious of their legal rights (especially economic and 
social rights).  A small sample survey of Chinese from various professions from 2005 to 
2006 suggested that over 60 percent of the urban Chinese and 38 percent of rural Chinese 
were aware that the Constitution protected citizens’ legal private property and that 90 
percent of the urban Chinese and over 60 percent of peasants believed correctly that the 
Constitution served to regulate state power and protect citizens’ rights.3   
Their awareness can be traced to a number of factors—people’s greater concerns 
with their material interests as their living standard improves and their wealth accumulate, 
greater media coverage over people’s legal rights, and the state’s recent efforts to protect 
citizens’ social and economic rights through constitutional amendment, such as that 
protects their private property.  In addition, it is likely that citizens are increasingly aware 
of the “best practice” regarding state protection of citizens’ rights and citizens’ initiatives 
in defending their rights in more developed economies, including Hong Kong, which is 
adjacent to Guangdong Province, as well as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the West.  
This change suggests rising Chinese consciousness as citizens, a slow maturation of the 
Chinese society and its growing embrace of international norms for citizens’ rights.   
The Chinese are more willing to turn to legal action, complaints and protests in 
order to safeguard their rights.  This change in public consciousness of the law and legal 
rights can be found in results of surveys over the years.  One 1999 survey of 1,460 
residents in four cities suggested that in addressing disputes with state authorities, 67 
percent of urban residents chose appeals to high level state authorities, 44 percent 
contacting the media, and 30 percent resort to the law.  A nationwide survey in 2005 
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suggested that the percentage of urban residents willing to use law to resolve their 
disputes with the state went up to 51 percent, that of those who would approached leaders 
of the agency in dispute and leaders at upper-level leaders declined to 15 and 18 percent, 
respectively, and that of those who intended to approach the media dropped to 6 percent.
4
  
The Chinese growing awareness of their rights and legal assertiveness are also reflected 
in the growing number of cases for re-trial in China in the recent years.  A senior judge at 
the Chinese Supreme Court attributed it to the growing Chinese consciousness of their 
legal rights, their unhappiness with improper legal procedure in the first trial and their 
resort to retrial for justice.
5
  
Meanwhile, the Chinese are less willing to trust the state authorities or the media in 
their recourse.  They are also more willing to act in a group in order to enhance their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the state and protect each individual in the process.  As a 
result, the percentage of the Chinese petitioners in person grew from 60 percent in 1998 
to 76 percent in 2001.  The aforementioned national survey in 2005 indicated that 13 
percent of the Chinese did use collective petition to solve their disputes with the state.
6
   
The growing rights and legal consciousness apparently suggests that the Chinese 
society is maturing, although slowly.  The Chinese citizens are becoming conscious of 
their legitimate rights as citizens, increasingly reluctant to place their hope for defense of 
their rights on state authorities and officials, and increasingly willing to use the court, 
which is seen as less partial than other state branches, to resolve their disputes with the 
state, and assert their independence from the state.  This trend indicates Chinese citizens’ 
(especially urban Chinese) growing awareness of utility of the legal system.  It also 
demonstrated an alarming decline in citizens’ trust in the state authorities, local leaders, 
and the media.  This dwindling trust in state authorities, as we shall see, has a grave 
implication for social stability in China. 
 
Fast Economic Opening and Positive Side of Governance 
 
As stated earlier, China’s model of development is characterized by fast social and 
economic opening but slow political opening.  One of the defining feature (or component) 
of China’s model of development is its model of governance.  There are two sides of the 
same “coin” of the Chinese governance.  On the one hand, the Chinese state is very 
effective in opening up the economy, building a market economy, and generating 
economic growth.  On the other hand and as to be elaborated in the coming section, the 
Chinese state has been slow and ineffectual in protecting the citizens’ social and 
economic rights, in easing popular grievances, and in enforcing rule of law.  These two 
conflicting sides of the coin make up for what I can pro-growth authoritarianism. 
The positive side of the Chinese governance helps to explain why the Chinese 
state has been very effective in opening up the economy, mobilizing resources, reforming 
its inefficient economic system, and paving the way for high economic growth.  
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Specifically, the Chinese state outperforms many other developing countries in the 
following two important areas. 
First, dramatic economic opening and promotion of trade (especially exports).  
Economic opening is regarded as a key to success in East Asia including China.
7
  China 
has been one of the few developing nations that has made rapid and decisive stride 
toward opening up its economy.  Within less than three decades, China has transformed 
itself from one of the most isolated economies to an economy closely integrated with the 
world economy.  China’s promotion of exports that confirm to China’s comparative 
advantage helps transformed the economy into a powerhouse of exports and a major 
manufacturing base. 
From the 1960s to the late 1970s China pursued self reliance and isolated itself 
from the market-oriented world economy.  Between 1955 and 1978, China was nearly 
free of foreign direct investment (FDI). During this period, tensions created a rift in 
China’s relations with the United States and with the USSR after 1960, thereby 
preventing mass introduction of investment from the Eastern and Western countries and 
the USSR.  Foreign loans, a politically less sensitive form of foreign capital, played a 
minor role in development, especially between 1960 and 1976. 
Since the late 1970s, with the firm support from initially Deng Xiaoping and later 
his successors, China decisively opens up its closed economy and steadily integrates with 
the world market.  There have been several landmark developments.  First, in 1979 four 
special economic zones (SEZs) were approved.  Second, in 1984, fourteen coastal port 
cities which accounted for 23 percent of the nation’s industrial output, including Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Wenzhou and Guangzhou, were opened up.  Then 
from 1985 to 1988 major coastal economic areas were also opened up.  From 1992 
onwards in the wake of Deng’s reform-promoting tour, inland border cities and provincial 
capitals were opened up.  In 2001, China took a historical step in its opening.  It joined 
the World Trade Organization, subjecting itself to the rules governing international trade, 
and linking itself closely with the world economy.
8
  China agreed to reduce average tariff 
levels for agricultural products to 15 percent and for industrial products to 8.9 percent by 
2004.  China also agreed to open significant service markets such as tele-communications, 
banking, insurance, securities, audiovisual, professional services, and importantly, 
wholesale and retail trade, post-sale service, repair, maintenance, and transportation.
9
  
Finally, in the reform era China also actively promotes its exports and attracts foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  One primary measure, as described above, is incremental and 
steady opening of localities and economic sectors and fiscal incentives for foreign 
investors.   
China’s promotion of exports helps transformed the economy into a powerhouse of 
exports and a major manufacturing base. China’s exports grew from $18.2 billion in 1980 
to $968.9 billion in 2006, and China’s FDI grew from $1.96 billion in 1985 to $69.5 
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billion in 2006, a 34.5 folds increase.
10
  In 2003, China’s FDI inflows reached $53,505 
million, the largest in the developing world.  It was five times as much as that of Brazil 
($10,144 million) and 12 times that of India ($4,269 million).
11
 China quickly surpassed 
other developing nations to become a major exporter of manufactures.  By 2004 the share 
of manufactured goods in China’s exports reached 91 percent, similar to that of South 
Korea (93 percent).  It far surpassed that of India (77 percent), Vietnam (50 percent), 
Indonesia and Brazil (52 percent), and Egypt (31 percent).
12
   
In 2007 China’s external market size, measured by exports of goods and services, 
was ranked No. 1 worldwide, even ahead of the U.S., Germany and Japan.  In 2004, 
China’s exports amounted to $593,369 million.  It was six times that of Brazil ($96,474 
million), eight times that of India ($72,530 million) and Indonesia ($69,710 million).
13
 
Second, capacity to undertake reform and development.  The Chinese state is 
capable of undertaking major tasks during reform and development.  For example, it 
overcame conservative opposition and successfully spread the household farming and 
economic opening nationwide.  It has made noticeable progress in reforming its 
restriction of non-state business and inefficient SOEs.  Since the early 1980s the Chinese 
government has also identified areas (such as counties) of poverty and introduced 
economic and social programs to lift the population there out of poverty. 
One of the most important factors underlying the effectiveness of the Chinese 
state is that it has a relatively able leadership and bureaucracy.  The Chinese leaders in the 
reform era, Deng in particular, possessed adroit political skills in overcoming and 
negotiating through obstacles and opposition and pushing through reform policies.  For 
example, he pushed hard for reform and opening when the opportunities were ripe (from 
1978-1980 and from 1984-87) or critical (such as in 1992).  He retreated temporarily 
when reform was dealt with setbacks, such as 1989-91.  In addition, he strategically 
selected localities that had the greatest local popular and official support and best geo-
economic conditions to experiment with reform and opening.  He also appointed able 
leaders to lead those localities.  They included Guangdong in the 1980s and 1990s and 
Shanghai after the mid 1980s.  He also allowed these localities to retain a higher share of 
fiscal income during their experimental reform.  Success of these provinces stimulated 
reform efforts and demands for liberalization from other provinces.
14
  Under the reformist 
leadership, the bureaucracy and the Party apparatus have been transformed from ones that 
were suited to political control and ideological indoctrination to one that maintains 
stability, encourages rapid economic growth and delivers decent macro economic 
management.  For example, two key measures that the Chinese leaders such as Deng 
Xiaoping adopted was to promote younger officials with knowledge in economic 
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management and who had successfully generated rapid economic growth in the units or 
localities under their jurisdiction.  This practice helped transform Chinese officials from 
ideological indoctrinators into official entrepreneurs.
15
   
In global comparison, the Chinese bureaucracy is relatively efficient in processing 
business cases and welcoming foreign investment.  According to The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 it took 35 days in China days required to start a 
business in 2007, much better than Vietnam (50), Indonesia (105), and Brazil (152).  It 
lagged slightly behind India (33 days) and Nigeria (33 days).  In terms of rules favoring 
foreign direct investment, China was ranked No. 55 out of 134 economies, behind 
Vietnam (No. 38), slightly behind that U.S. (No. 53).  China was ahead of India (No. 61), 
France (No. 65), and Thailand (No. 68), and well ahead of Brazil (No. 82).
16
   
Some scholars, like Bruce Gilley, questioned that the Chinese authoritarian state 
helped to drive China’s high economic growth.17  Nevertheless, as the aforementioned 
analysis and literature indicate, authoritarianism did play a positive role in the Chinese 
miracle.  Ogden’s view which Gilley criticized thus made sense.  She faulted Indian 
government for failing to solve social problems and credited the Chinese state for 
carrying out policies in the long-term interest of the population.
18
   As far as quickly 
lifting the population out of poverty is concerned, the Chinese state has been more 
effective than the Indian state.  From 1981 to 2001 the percentage of the population in 
poverty declined by about 40% in China, doubling that in India in the same period.
19
 
Overall, thanks to the aforementioned strengths of the Chinese governance China 
enjoys the highest economic growth for the past three decades in the world.  China’s GDP 
per capita at exchange rate increased from US$227 in 1978 to US$2,485 in 2007.  
China’s economic performance even dwarfs that of India, which has attracted 
international attention for its starlet growth performance.  From 1995 to 2004 China’s 
annual GDP growth reached 9.1 percent, 3.1 percent higher than that of India.
20
 
 
Slow Opening of Politics and Limits of Governance 
 
Despite the aforementioned advantages, the limits of China’s model of governance are 
also apparent.  They are reflected in a host of serious problems, including weak rule or 
law and official corruption, violations of citizens’ rights by the powerful and the rich, 
unequal distribution of the fruits of high growth, as well as environmental degradation.  
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As a result, the rich and the powerful tend to benefit more from reform and development 
than do the lower class.   
In many ways, the positive and negative sides of China’s pro-growth governance 
are intricately interrelated.  A single-minded pursuit of high growth and refusal to open 
up the political system are interlocked core features of pro-growth authoritarianism.  In 
1979, in response to the Democracy Wall Movement in Beijing, Deng spelled out the 
“four cardinal principles”.  The most important principle was to uphold the CCP’s 
leadership of the nation.  The “four cardinal principles” were cemented as the political 
pillar of the Party in the following decade, with the purges of two liberally-minded 
Party’s General Secretary, i.e., Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989 and with 
the rise of orthodox reformists led by Deng, who embraced rapid economic opening and 
reform but slow political opening.
21
   
Growth-oriented authoritarianism is based on all-out efforts to promote high growth 
for the Party’s continued dominance.  Deng, as well as his successors who I coin 
orthodox reformists, believed that the Party could sustain its political power through 
promoting economic growth and improving people’s material well-being.22  Simply put, 
until the recent years, there has been a prevalent thinking among China’s leaders and 
officials that high economic growth and a living standard are sufficient to earn the Party 
political legitimacy.
23
   
In actual policy making and implementation officials perceive that respects for 
citizens’ social and economic rights, economic justice, and environmental protection 
would increase considerably difficulties for materializing high growth within a short span 
and would even slow down economic growth.  As the Party dominates politics and can 
implement policies without political opposition and with little social resistance, officials 
are able and in fact tend to push forth their pro-growth agenda without taking into 
account people’s legitimate concerns.  Meanwhile, free from public supervision and 
monopolizing political power, officials were tempted to trade their control of market 
entry and economic resources for wealth from the rich or the gangsters.  This gave rise to 
corruption and criminal gangs.  Nevertheless, violations of citizens’ rights, unequal 
distribution of wealth, and limited channels for public grievances inevitably lead to mass 
popular protests.  In the following paragraphs major problems in governance will be 
discussed briefly.    
 
1. Lack of Rule of Law and Rampant Corruption 
 
China’s top leaders started to actively and publicly promote rule of law back in the late 
1990s.  At the closing ceremony of the annual session of the NPC in March 1996, Qiao 
Shi, the chief of the Chinese legislature (National People’s Congress), formally called on 
the Party to “rule the country in accordance with law, and build a legally institutionalized 
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socialist country.” One month after his assumption of the post of the Party’s General 
Secretary, Hu Jintao declared at a meeting of at the 20
th
 anniversary of implementation of 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China that Party should abide by the 
Constitution.
24
  Nevertheless, in reality, the courts at all levels are dominated by a 
political and legal committee of the Party at the same level and the courts are hardly 
independent in reaching verdicts.
25
  The courts and judges cannot independently make 
legal decisions and are subject to political interference.    
In international perspective China’s performance in rule of law is mediocre and falls 
well short of its economic competitiveness.  Judicial independence is a key indicator of 
rule of law.  In this aspect, China was ranked No. 69 out of 134 economies worldwide,   
It is far behind Egypt (No. 42) and India (No. 43) and very similar to Brazil (No. 68).  
This contrasts sharply with China’s status as the No. 30 most competitive economy.   
Concentration of power into the hands of a few leading Party officials at each 
level, their important role in economic decisions, as well as the rapidly expanding 
economy, create ample opportunities for the officials to enrich themselves.  On the other 
hand, institutional and public restraints on official behavior are ineffectual due to the lack 
of genuine rule of law, opening of the political process, lack of public supervision, and 
the absence of an independent press.  Very often, several top local leaders, especially the 
Party Secretary, control key personnel appointments,
26
 including the members of the 
political and legal committee and the head of the Department of Propaganda, and even 
top managers of leading local newspapers and TV stations (which are usually state 
owned).  They thus indirectly dictate local legal decisions.  No local courts and local 
media dare to challenge the decisions and policies formulated by local leaders.  Nor will 
they take up cases or stories suggesting of corruption of these leaders.  This usually gives 
a green light for abuse of power and corruption of local leaders.  
In addition, as guanxi plays a key role in official promotion, candidates for office 
may resort to bribery and nepotism in order to gain office.  Furthermore, officials whose 
career advancement is less promising may also concentrate on rent-seeking activities, 
instead of polishing their performance records in order to advance their careers.  These 
traits of official behavior only induce corruption.
27
 
Transparency International, a reputed international agency, ranked China No. 78 
out of 159 countries and areas in the world in 2005.  Mainland China earned a meager 3.2 
out of a scale of 10, as 10 stood for no corruption.  Its low score was in sharp contrast 
with other high-scoring Asian economies—Singapore’s 9.4, Hong Kong’s 8.3, Japan’s 7.3, 
Taiwan’s 5.9, and South Korea’s 5.0.  It also lagged behind several other developing 
Asian economies—Malaysia (5.1), Thailand (3.8), and even very backward Laos (3.3).  It 
was also behind several major emerging economies such as Brazil (3.7) and Poland (3.4).  
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The only comforting fact was that China was slightly ahead of other slightly poorer Asian 
economies, i.e., India (2.9), Vietnam (2.6), Philippines (2.5), and Indonesia (2.2).
28
  
The severity of corruption in China was also confirmed by a survey from late 
2006 to early 2007 among private entrepreneurs in coastal China who had a more 
intimate knowledge about official rent-seeking behavior.  Some 19.0 percent of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that most officials in their county or city were 
corrupt and 63.1 percent agreed that some officials in their county or city were corrupt.
29
  
Official rent-seeking and corruption is thought to be more serious in inland areas.  
Therefore, overall corruption in China remains serious. 
 
2. Unequal Distribution of Wealth  
 
In the reform era, under Deng’s call, some areas, especially the coastal region, were 
encouraged to grow earlier and faster than the rest of the nations and certain social groups, 
especially entrepreneurs and managers, to get rich first.  This uneven growth policy was 
to break Mao’s egalitarianism that discouraged individual entrepreneurship, productive 
activities, and innovations. As a result, income inequalities in China have grown.  The 
Gini coefficient of income distribution in China registered a low 0.288 in 1981, yet 
soared to an alarming 0.403 in 1998; it continued to rise 0.459 in 2001, on par with US’s 
0.466.
30
  China’s Gini coefficient further rose to 0.496 in 2005.  In 2006 in a nationwide 
public opinion survey income inequalities were regarded the third most serious social 
problems.
31
  Income inequalities developed along three dimensions—rural-urban gap, 
inter-regional gap (most noticeably coastal-inland gap), and inter-strata gap.
32
  
Nevertheless, weak state institutions for income redistribution do not help to stem the 
income gaps.  As a result, inequalities along these three dimensions continue to grow.  
Out of the three dimensions the most alarming is rural-urban income gap.  The disposable 
income of an average peasant was equivalent to 53.8 percent of that of an average urban 
resident in 1985.  It declined sharply to 34.9 percent in 1994 and registered a deplorable 
30.5 percent in 2006.
33
 
Until recent years the state, especially at the local level, has tried much hard in 
catering to the needs of entrepreneurs than offering economic assistance and provisioning 
welfare to the lower classes. Social spending out of governmental budget is viewed as 
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economically wasteful and unhelpful for generating high economic growth.  Many 
officials would rather concentrate on wooing investment in order to generate GDP than 
on collecting and channeling revenue into the financing of local welfare programs and for 
equal income distribution.   
 
3. Violation of Citizens’ Rights in Development 
 
Many officials view high growth as the ultimate barometer of governance of their 
localities. They often regard local residents’ legitimate demand for protection of their 
interests obstacles to the rapid economic development.  For example, they favor swift 
confiscation of rural land for industrial parks and estate development and make low 
compensation for peasants in order to reduce business costs and woo investors.  In 
addition, they treat local people’s complaints about infringement of their social-economic 
interests (such as resettlement, pollution and noise from plants) by local developmental 
projects as trouble making and detrimental to their pursuit of high growth.  They rely on 
public security or even mafia to suppress protestors.   
One of the most serious and widespread cases of infringement of rights arise from 
the use of agricultural land.  It was estimated that from 1987 to 2001 34-51 million 
peasants lost their land to non-agricultural use of land.  According to a survey of ten 
provinces, 69 percent of the land of industrial park was taken over by local authorities 
illegally.  In many of these cases, inadequate compensation was quite common.  In 
particular, in inland provinces such as Henan, Yunnan, Shanxi, peasants’ income declined 
by 25, 26, and 9.4, percent, respectively.  Even in coastal provinces such as Tianjin and 
Liaoning, despite higher income after compensation, peasants who lost land suffered 
from a real decline in income due to their moving into urban areas where living expenses 
were higher.  There were cases where village cadres enriched themselves whereas 
villagers received only a portion of compensation that was deemed reasonable.  These 
cases of official corruption in land use served to instigate social tensions and conflict.
34
 
 
4. Limited Channels for Remedies of Public Grievances 
 
From the beginning of reform, China’s leaders rejected any conspicuous attempt to open 
up the political system and introduce democracy.  The only exception is direct and 
relatively open election of village chiefs and villager committees.
35
   As a result of this 
political strategy, China has indeed avoided the political upheavals and instability that the 
former Soviet Union (such as Russia and its former Republics in Central Asia), as well as 
democratized Asian nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand experienced.   
However, the development-first strategy has entailed grave political, social and 
even economic consequences.  The ruling Chinese Communist Party has maintained the 
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closed political system.  There have been few channels for the public and concerned 
parties to influence and shape public policy.  As Bernstein and Lü observed in their study 
on protests in rural China, peasants protested, sometimes even violently, because local 
officials arbitrarily imposed economic burdens on them through illicit taxation, fees and 
projects and targeting meeting without consulting peasants.
36
   
As a result of the closed political system and largely closed policy making process, 
policies that are implemented can be short-sighted and do little to improve people’s well-
being.  In addition, new officials may pursue a whole set of policies different from their 
predecessors in order to claim political credits.  Officials have weak incentives to help out 
disadvantaged groups.  These groups include rural migrants and the poor, as well as a 
portion of the Tibetan and Uighur population.  These groups benefit modestly from 
economic development.  These groups inevitably feel that they lag far behind other 
groups in the course of rapid economic development and are neglected by the 
government. 
Pro-growth authoritarianism that has been discussed inevitably leads to social 
grievances.  As their legitimate rights are violated urban residents and rural residents try 
to seek justice.
37
  One form of action is individual or collective appeals to officials.  
Nevertheless, the citizens’ channels for complaints and grievance airing are restricted due 
to the institutional barriers the state has set up.  As Cai put it, “workers and peasants have 
experienced significant failures using appeals in their struggles against abusive cadres”.38 
Most importantly, the institutional setup largely discourages officials from 
responding promptly and effectively to citizens’ complaints.  Officials are appointed by 
their superiors; getting along with colleagues and other officials is thus important for 
leaving a good impression upon the superiors.  Addressing infringement of legitimate 
economic and social rights by the officials and the rich would require decisive action that 
may risk alienating colleagues, subordinates and local powerful groups and may invite 
their retributions.  Without effective institutions of public supervision and censor such as 
free elections of officials and a free press, local officials and courts are under no public 
pressure to address public grievances.  Some local officials even call upon the police and 
gangsters to prevent disgruntled people from airing their grievances to their superiors.  In 
response, discontented citizens resort to disrupting public order and destroying public 
property and governmental offices in order to vent their grievances and anger.  Their 
rationale may be that by escalating the tension protesters they would attract the higher 
authority’s attention to their grievances and that the higher authority will then force the 
local official to change their behavior.  
 
High Growth Coupled with Frequent Protests in China 
 
China has maintained rapid economic growth during the past three decades.  From 1978 
to 2008 China’s GDP grew at a brisk 9.8 percent per annum, and increased by fifteen 
folds.  
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From 1993 to 2006, China’s GDP annual growth rate ranged from 7.6 percent to 14 
percent.  The average growth at nearly 10 percent (9.96 percent to be exact) was higher 
than the averaged growth rate of 9.6 percent from 1978-92.
 39
  One may be tempted to 
conclude that thanks to higher economic growth China should witness fewer popular 
protests in the later period than the earlier period.    
However, what actually happened was the opposite.  From 1993 to 2005, China 
witnessed a steady and rapid growth in collective grievances and protests. The number of 
petitions to the national government, a key Chinese form of expressing grievances 
especially at the local levels, was only 297,900 in 1984.  But it started to grow in the 
1994 and totaled 586,400 in 2000 and reached 603,000 in 2005.
40
  
China’s GDP grew on average at 9.8 percent a year from 1994-1999 and 9.5 percent 
from 2000-2006.  As the economic performance in these two periods was very impressive 
and comparable, popular protests in these two periods should have been stable in number 
and small in total.  In China a more direct and explosive form of expression of public 
grievances is collective protests, which refer to protests by over five participants.  The 
number of collective protests registered at 10,000 in 1994; it increased to 32,000 in 1999.  
Instead of declining during the period of 2000- 2006, it creased further to 40,000 in 2000 
and grew steadily to an estimate 90,000 in 2006.
41
  The period of 2000-2006 witnessed 
more frequent collective protests than that of 1993-99.  In 2006 the number of collective 
protests was 10.3 times of that in 1993, averaging nearly 20 percent growth per annum, 
more than twice as fast the GDP growth rate.   
Thus it is apparent that high economic growth does not necessarily lead to solid 
political legitimacy of the ruling elites, nor does it preempt popular dissatisfaction with 
the political regime.  Even though high economic growth may increase the level of 
popular support for the regime, it does not preclude outbreaks of popular protests.  Indeed, 
this is the hardest lesson the CCP learned in the summer of 1989 and from 1993 to 2006.  
The following is an analysis of one of the most-noticed riots in China in 2008, which can 
help shed light on the negative implications of uneven opening in China in the economy, 
society and politics for social stability and the society, as well as pro-growth 
authoritarianism.  It also suggests the Chinese leaders’ awareness of societal opening and 
their more pragmatic approach to social protests. 
 
Weng’an:  Protests against Erroneous Pro-Growth Governance 
 
Among the recent protests in the 2000s few may match the scale of the riots in Weng’an 
in June 2008.  The riots in Weng’an illustrate well the side effects of blatant pursuit of 
high economic growth at the expenses of people’s social and economic rights, as well as 
the dark side of pro-growth governance in China.  They also shed light on the dynamics 
of interaction between discontented people, predatory officials, and the usually far-away 
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central government.  As the riots in Weng’an became a national and international news 
headline, top leaders of China were so alarmed at the appalling errors in governance of 
Weng’an that they immediately acted to address the popular grievances there. 
 
1. The Trigger and the Riots 
 
Weng’an is a county in Guizhou, one of the least developed provinces in China.  On June 
21, 2008, Li Shufen, nearly 16-year-old junior high school female student, committed 
suicide by jumping into a river at night.  Liu, a friend of Li’s boyfriend Chen, tried to 
rescue her but failed.  All three went to the riverside after a drinking session.  Miss Wang, 
Li’s classmate, who was also at the scene, stated that Li had long resented her parents’ 
prejudiced treatment of her as a girl and that this could be a cause for her death.
42
  Later 
rumors spread in the county that Li was raped by Chen and Liu, murdered and thrown 
into the river, that Chen and Liu were relatives of local ranking officials and that the local 
police covered up the case and protected them.  For days parents of Li refused to accept 
the official verdict that Li committed suicide and placed the body of their daughter at the 
scene of the incident.  Rumors also were circulated in the county that Li’s uncle, aunts, 
grandparents and mother was beaten by the local security.  
On the afternoon of June 28, 300 people gathered near Li’s body and marched to the 
office of the county’s public security.  By 4 pm nearly 10,000 people assembled outside 
the office.  The confrontation between police and protesters, however, went out of control.  
At 4:30 pm protesters and spectators started to break into the office building, smashed 
and burned offices, and broke into offices of the nearby people’s government, the bureau 
of finance, and the Party committee of the county.  By 6 pm the crowd reached 20,000.  
Police vehicles were set on fire.  A crowd of about 10,000 remained outside the 
governmental office buildings until 3 a.m. of June 29.  On the early next morning a 
crowd of about 6,000 gathered again and tried to break into governmental offices.  They 
were dispersed by the armed police.  The rioters destroyed much of office buildings for 
the county’s Party committee, people’s government (the administration) and public 
security, as well as 42 cars; 150 people were injured.
43
 
 
2. Sources of Protests 
 
In fact, in the recent years the economy of the county has been growing rapidly thanks to 
a number of economic initiatives.  However, the controversial death of Li directly 
triggered the mass riots in the county.  According to emerging official in-depth 
investigations, the real sources of tensions laid in the erratic governance of the county.   
Shi Zongyuan, Guizhou’s Party Secretary, pointed out three main causes of the riots.  The 
first two were particularly relevant for my argument here.  The first cause was that 
interests of Weng’an residents were violated in the extraction of minerals and 
resettlement and that local leaders often used public security forces to suppress people’s 
grievances.  The second cause was that that the county’s leaders and public security failed 
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to crack down on local crime and criminal gangs, that many local crimes remained 
unsolved and that local people lost their trust in the public security.
 44
 
Several cases show vividly how the local government’s reckless pursuit of high 
growth and blatant transgression of people’s rights sowed the seeds for unrest.  One case 
was the extraction of the phosphorus ores, one of the rich minerals in the county, in the 
Yan’gen Village.  Back in 1998 Weng’an County Phsphorization Company started to 
extract minerals underneath the village.  By 2003, the operation caused a drop in the 
water level in the Tianba Group of the village.  As a result, the paddy field of 285 mu 
could not irrigated, the spring villagers used as drinking water source was polluted, and 
the livelihood of 280 villagers was threatened.  The villagers appealed to the township 
government in vain.  In January 2007 the county granted the rights to Aisikai Company to 
extract ores in the village, and a provincial commercial newspaper estimated the output of 
the extraction would worth 200 million yuan.  Villagers made collective appeals to local 
government and demanded that the issues about drinking water, paddy irrigation and 
sinking of the ground be addressed before the start of the extraction.  Villager 
representatives even travelled to Guiyang, the provincial capital.  But again, there was no 
solution to their satisfaction.  In March villagers blocked the entry of representatives from 
the township and county governments.  In April the county government summoned 
villager representatives to the county office to discuss the resolution of the dispute.  
However, seven representatives were arrested upon arrival for criminal charges.  Upon 
learning the news over 100 villagers went to the county office and entered into a row with 
the police. In December 2007 the seven villager representatives were sentenced by the 
county court to prison terms of two to seven years for disrupting public order, for causing 
losses of 2 million yuan in the operation of the Aisikai Company.  Their appeal was 
overturned by the prefectural court. 
The second case had to do with ran-away crimes, especially against teenagers.  
Crimes in the county ran out of control.  Since 2006 several crimes victimizing teenagers 
had occurred in the county.  In 2006 a nine –year old boy was kidnapped by human 
smugglers.  When his uncle reported the case to the public security, he got into a quarrel 
with the police and was beaten up.  In December 2007 a girl student was raped and 
murdered 200 meters outside her home, and the culprit remained at large.  In addition, 
there were over ten known criminal gangs that rampaged in the county.  They included 
the Jade Mountain Gang, the Ax Gang, and the Kitchen Knife Gang.  Local residents 
refrained from going out after 7 pm out of fear of robbery.  As many crimes remained 
unsolved, local residents were greatly dissatisfied with the local security.  Their distrust 
played a role in the spread of rumors about police cover-up of the rape and murder of Li 
and the outbreak of riots.
 45
 
 
3. Aftermaths 
 
The mass riots in Weng’an shook the nation and the world.  Hu Jintao, the Chinese 
President and the General Secretary of the CCP, urged quick and proper management of 
the protests.  He also subtly blamed local authority for not resolving popular grievances 
in the past and for too readily using the police to suppress angry citizens.  In the wake of 
                                                 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 “Weng’an Before the June 28 Incident,” Liaowang Dongfang Weekly, No. 29, July 2008. 
 16 
the protests, the Party secretary, the magistrate, and the chief of public security of the 
Weng’an County were dismissed.  Official media subtly portrayed these incompetent 
officials as a primary cause of the mass riots.  Immediately after the riots, the Guizhou 
Provincial Party Secretary spent days in the county investigating the causes of the riots.  
One of the conclusions he draw was that the riots invalidated one of the theories once 
popular among Chinese officials that once the economy grew rapidly the society would 
be stable.
46
  The moderate and restrained response from the Chinese national and 
provincial leadership suggested that even the leadership was aware of the growing 
openness of the society and the need for changing the management of state-societal 
relations.  However and unfortunately, this change does not apply to the political system 
as a whole. 
In retrospect, the people in Weng’an claimed a moral victory by taking dramatic 
action.  They exposed the long-existing problems in mis-governance of the locality and 
gained the much-needed attention to the embedded problems from the top leaders.  In 
addition, they gained a far fairer treatment in the aftermath of the riots than most previous 
riots.  In the past the state authority would have blacked out news reports and would have 
sent in the military, which would result in losses of lives in the conflict.  It would have 
arrested the protest leaders, would have sentenced them to heavy terms if not death 
sentence, and would have condemned the riots as “anti-revolutionary” or “subversion of 
the state”.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the reform period China’s economy and to a lesser extent society has undergone 
considerable opening.  In contrast, much of the political process and political system 
remain closed, despite much progress compared to Mao’s era.  This article investigates 
the uneven opening of China’s economy, society and politics as well as positive and 
negative sides of China’s pro-growth governance.  It suggests that the Chinese society has 
benefited from the opening and that the Chinese have become conscious of their 
legitimate social and economic rights and are willing to defend them.   It also points out 
that the Chinese state has been very capable of rapidly opening up the economy, 
overcoming obstacles to economic development, and achieving growth.    
The negative aspects of China’s pro-growth governance, however, cannot be 
ignored.  Negative byproducts of pro-growth authoritarianism include weak rule of law, 
official corruption, violation of people’s rights, and few channels for public inputs in 
policy and public grievances.  These defects of the Chinese governance help to account 
for outbursts of frequent protests during the period of high economic growth.  
As China’s economy rapidly expands and the Chinese living standard rises, the 
Chinese society is changing, becoming increasingly mature and open.  As discussed 
above, the Chinese citizens are increasingly aware of their legal rights and have learned 
to forge social bonds within small groups for their own protection.  They must also be 
aware of the good practice of rights protection and citizens’ action in defending their 
rights in developed economies.   
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For these reasons in the reform era high economic growth goes hand in hand in a 
rise in popular protests in China.  In the 1980s democracy protests were the norm; into 
the 1990s and 2000s social protests have become daily occurrence. The case of Weng’an 
illustrates that high economic growth at the great expenses of people’s legitimate 
demands for economic survival and public security will incite social protests, instead of 
generating popular support.  Therefore, the argument which has been long accepted by 
the Chinese officials and even leaders that high economic growth would automatically 
translate into popular support and social stability is flawed. 
On the other hand, the moderate state responses to riots in the recent months, such 
as those in Weng’an, indicate a growing strength of the Chinese society.  Importantly, it 
points to national leaders’ growing understanding of the increased opening of the society, 
social tensions, and their improvement in handling of social conflicts. 
The seemingly viable way for China to escape the quandary of rising instability 
amidst high economic growth is to reform its pro-growth authoritarianism.  A number of 
modifications of the tight authoritarian governance are vital for reduction of public 
discontent.  An effective remedy of the sources of public grievances requires the opening 
of the political process for public participation, political transparency, media supervision, 
direct and public election of representatives, and greater independence of the legal system.  
Specifically, greater public inputs in economic policy making is needed, fair 
compensation for material losses in the execution of developmental projects is necessary, 
public yearning for a low-crime and economic security has to be satisfied, and public 
supervision and election of official policies needs to be implemented.  Furthermore, 
media’s open and truthful reports on political event and supervision of officials should be 
tolerated, and the court should be allowed to play a bigger role in resolving disputes, 
including those involving the state and citizens.  Only by addressing the negative side of 
China’s governance can China experience genuine social stability in the course of high 
growth.    Otherwise, a state effective in pushing forth economic opening and generating 
growth but ineffective in protecting rights will continue to be harassed by social protests.   
 
 
  
 
